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"And if, to be sure, sometimes you need to conceal a fact with words, do it in such a way that it does not become known, or, if it does become known, that you have a ready and quick defence." -Niccoló Machiavelli, 1522
We investigate if concerns of social image affect how individuals express their beliefs. It has already been established in several studies that individuals care about how others view them 2 . Our investigation centers on whether and how individuals mitigate selfish behavior by manipulating perceptions of their beliefs. We begin by demonstrating that individuals may not have a true preference for fairness or reciprocity, but rather are motivated by their concern over their social-or self-image. In other words, individuals have a preference for appearing to be fair, instead of actually behaving fairly. Further, this concern over image will not motivate selfish individuals to change their selfish behavior. Instead, imageconscious selfish individuals will maintain their selfish behavior, but go out of their way to create the false impression that they are cooperative. We then demonstrate the strategies by which imageconscious selfish individuals create the false impression that they are cooperative. We propose that individuals, with the intention of maintaining their social image, purposely manipulate information they know others might use to evaluate their actions. Specifically, we look at whether individuals who take a selfish action will subsequently lie about the beliefs they held when they took that action in a way that mitigates their selfish behavior.
The novelty of our paper is to compare two different belief elicitation methods to expose subjects' motivations and strategies. In our approach we look at the difference between stated beliefs, the beliefs subjects express when their social image is at stake, and revealed beliefs, the beliefs subjects express when their entire payoff is at stake. To our knowledge we are the first to introduce this method of comparing belief elicitation methods as well as introducing the revealed beliefs elicitation device itself.
We conduct a modified trust game, after which we obtain the two measures of beliefs. First, we directly ask subjects to state the beliefs they held when they made certain decisions. We term these stated beliefs, as there are no monetary consequences for stating inaccurate beliefs. Second, we implement a belief elicitation device where subjects indirectly express their beliefs by placing bets on different game outcomes. We term these revealed beliefs, as subjects' entire payoff is as stake and subjects are unaware that their beliefs are being measured. We find that subjects who take a selfish action in the trust game subsequently exhibited large differences between their stated beliefs and their revealed beliefs. Selfish subjects stated that they believed their opponent also took a selfish action. However, in contrast with what they stated when asked directly, selfish subjects staked their payoff on the chance that their opponent took a cooperative action. Thus, these subjects were revealed to believe that their opponent was in fact cooperative. By comparison, subjects who took a cooperative action in the trust game do not display this difference between their stated and revealed beliefs. In order to rule out confusion as an explanation for the difference between stated and revealed beliefs we measure the decision-making sophistication of subjects. Sophisticated subjects are subjects who did not violate stochastic dominance in the revealed elicitation task 3 . Our key result is that we find that the subjects with the largest differences between their stated and revealed beliefs are the subjects who are both selfish and sophisticated.
We suggest that the reason for the disparity between the selfish subjects' stated and revealed beliefs is that these selfish individuals are precluded from using their action to signal a positive social image.
Instead, the selfish Players must use their stated beliefs to signal their motivation in making a selfish decision and in doing so, mitigate their selfish actions and preserve a positive social image. On the other hand, subjects who have taken the cooperative action can signal a positive social image with their action alone and thus, would have no need to alter their social image through their stated beliefs.
Underlying these behavioral propositions is the hypothesis that individuals have a skilled understanding of the way others think. In particular, we propose that individuals understand the cognitive processes fundamental in judgment and that it is this sophisticated understanding of how humans judge others that may explain why sophisticated-selfish subjects express two contradictory beliefs. We propose that the sophisticated-selfish subjects use stated beliefs as an opportunity to influence others' perception of their selfish decisions whereas the revealed beliefs capture their "true" beliefs. We find that first-movers believe that second-movers will be more generous when the second-movers believe the first-mover intended to be generous. A key finding is that sophisticated-selfish second-movers are able to anticipate this belief and are able to alter their stated beliefs to match this expectation.
Moreover, we do not find evidence in support of positive reciprocity. Even when Players believe that their partner has been generous toward them, they do not positively reciprocate as would be predicted by many theories of reciprocity. Importantly, we find that these Players go out of their way to state on the stated belief elicitation that they believed the other Player was unkind to them. Again, when we examine these same Players' incentivized revealed beliefs, we find that they did in fact believe that their partner 3 Please see Section II for a complete explanation of how subjects' Sophistication was determined.
was generous and were willing to stake their entire payoff on this fact. Thus it seems unlikely that their selfish actions were driven by a preference for reciprocity. Rather, our results indicate that reciprocity may be followed only when there are no viable excuses to relieve the obligation to return kindness for kindness. When even under a small amount of social pressure, subjects will go out of their way to "blame the victim" to relieve themselves of the social responsibility to be generous.
Our results have important implications for policy. Previous research has focused on eliciting emotional reactions in individuals in order to influence charitable donations or encouraging adhesion to social norms in order to motivate prosocial behavior. In light of our results, the strategies promoted by previous work may, in fact, drive people away from other-regarding behavior.
Given that beliefs seem to be playing a larger role in theory and are being increasingly relied upon as an explanation for behavior, it seems prudent to examine whether beliefs are influenced by social demand.
This demand can take the form of experimenter demand, audience demand, or demand of societal expectation. Perhaps subjects write beliefs that they want to use as "socially acceptable excuses" to validate and explain why they behaved as they did. Further, humans may know how to give the "right answers" to project their image of themselves to others (that is, manipulate others' perceptions. If this is indeed the case, careful attention must be paid to all of the incentives faced by individuals when measuring their beliefs.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I provides background on social influence, social preferences and beliefs; Section II describes the experimental design and predictions; Section III presents the results;
Section IV provides discussion; and Section V concludes. Readers familiar with the literature on social preferences and beliefs may wish to skip directly to Section II.
I. Interaction of Social Preferences and Beliefs
Social pressure in varying forms, such as reciprocity and guilt aversion, has been shown to produce prosocial behavior in lab settings (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Charness and Levin, 2007; Charness and Haruvey, 2002; Blount, 1993) . However, previous research has taken for granted that individuals' only alternative in the face of social pressure is to behave cooperatively.
Recent evidence has suggested that a concern for projecting a social image of being fair or reciprocal dominates concerns for reciprocity or fairness and those individuals only appear to have concerns regarding fairness, reciprocity and intentions. When confronted with an opportunity to give, a selfish person may give if they feel that their social or self image is at stake. These individuals may truly prefer to be self-regarding, but refrain under social pressure (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Dana, et. al 2007) .
For example Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) Dana, et. al. (2007) find that Dictators chose to remain ignorant of the consequences of their actions so as to retain the "moral wiggle room" to act selfishly.
In addition to preferences, beliefs have played an important role in explaining prosocial behavior 4 .
Several past studies have incorporated beliefs about subject intentions in models of reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Levine, 1998; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) . These models claim that individuals' actions are motivated by their beliefs about the intentions of others.
Individuals will go out of their way to reward those who have intentionally shown them kindness and punish those who have intentionally hurt them even if doing so is costly to the rewarder/punisher (Falk and Fischbacher, 2000; Andreoni, Brown, and Vesterlund, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Charness and Levin, 2007; Charness and Haruvey, 2002; Blount, 1993) . While previous studies of social preferences have made a point of using beliefs to provide motivation for other-regarding preferences, many of these papers have studied beliefs only indirectly or, if measured directly, only impose a small cost to subjects for lying. In a separate study, Dufwenberg et al. (2006) elicited beliefs in one-shot public goods games to explore the impact of framing and to assess theories of reciprocity and guiltaversion. They found that when Players know they are expected to be other-regarding they give according to what they believe others expect of them.
4 Many theories of social preferences have allowed for belief-dependent motivation based off of Geanakopolos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1988) who found that traditional methods were inadequate in representing preferences that exhibit belief-dependent motivations. reciprocity theory, in which a Player's preferences over material payoff distributions are influenced by the co-Players intentions, is a well-known application of "psychological" game theory. Several extensions of Rabin's 1993 theory, including Dufwenberg and Kirsteiger (2004) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) have illustrated the importance of incorporating updated beliefs, others' beliefs, and Players' plans of how they intend to play. For example, Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) suggest that individuals care about what other people give to others in order to avoid aversive feelings of guilt based on co-Players beliefs and expectations.
II. Experimental Design and Predictions
Each session consisted of three stages. In the first stage, subjects play a modified Trust game with binary choices. We employ the strategy method: subjects were asked to make binding choices for different scenarios, and paid based on one randomly chosen scenario at the end of the session. All choices were made with paper and pencil. In the second and third stages we collect non-incentivized stated beliefs and incentivized elicited beliefs, respectively.
A. Stage 1: Choices
We use a variation of the Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe Trust (1995) game that restricts all Players to binary choices. This was done to facilitate the belief elicitation in Stage 3. In Stage 1 subjects are randomly divided into pairs and randomly assigned to roles as Player 1 (P1) or Player 2 (P2). To begin, $10 is placed into Player 1's "account". Player 1 now decides either to send the whole $10 to Player 2 or to send $2 to Player 2 and keep $8. The amount sent to Player 2 is tripled. Player 2 decides how much of the tripled transfer they received, , to return to Player 1. Player 2 must decide between two options:
(1) whether to return . Further, with probability 1 − , Player 1's choice determines the amount transferred to Player 2 (either $10 or $2), and, with probability nature intervenes and the "Experimenter" forces Player 1 to send the whole $10 to Player 2. We examine choices for six different values of p, p ϵ (0, 0.05, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 1). The parameter is common knowledge, but Player 2 cannot observe whether nature intervened. We employ the strategy method to elicit choices for all six values of : each Player makes choices on six different "Decision Sheets". Player 1 subjects make a total of 6 choices: one choice on each of 6 sheets by marking whether they would choose to send $10 or $2 to Player 2 for each sheet (even the treatment where = 1). By comparison, Player 2 subjects make 12 total choices: a conditional choice for the possibility that $10 is sent, and, a conditional choice for the possibility that $2 is sent for each value of �. For ease of reference, a diagram of the game is provided in Figure 1 . could have held about who was responsible for sending the $10: first, Player 1 was responsible themselves for sending the $10, or, second, Player 1 was forced by the Experimenter to send the $10.
This stage was designed to test if individuals operate on the assumption that their intentions will be taken into account when being judged by others. Therefore, Player 1 was asked to predict the chances that Player 2 sent back $15 or $5 for each of two possibilities: first, if Player 2 believed Player 1 was responsible for sending the $10 and second, if Player 2 believed Player 1 was not responsible for sending the $10 (i.e. Player 1 was forced by the Experimenter). Player 1 was then asked to predict the chances that Player 2 sent $3 or $1 back to Player 1 under the $2 possibility. Player 1 made predictions for all six values of . Again, it was made clear to subjects that there was no penalty or reward given for accuracy.
Player 2 subjects were asked to predict the chances that Player 1 would send either $10 or $2. They were specifically instructed to predict the chances that Player 1 chose $10 or $2 on their Decision Sheet and not the chances that Player 2 would receive $10 or $2 (which depends on the chances that Player 1's decision is chosen). Player 2 made predictions for all six values of . Again, there was no penalty or reward given for accuracy.
C. Stage 3: Incentivized "Revealed" Belief Elicitation
We employ a unique method in order to measure first-order beliefs about what Player 1 and Player 2 thought the other Player had done. We use a Multiple Price List style approach to measure Player 1 and Player 2's preference between two payment options. An advantage of our method over other elicitation methods is that our method is not affected by risk aversion. Subjects were informed that they would be making a series of decisions on "how they would like to be paid" on a Payment Option Form. Option 1 is the "Outcome of the Game". If Players choose this option, they are paid based on the outcome of the game they played with their opponent. Subjects knew that the payment they would receive under this option, either $ 1 6
(the "low" amount) or $ and a 1 − chance of receiving
. Option 2 varied in incremental steps of 5%, which ranged from a 0% chance of receiving $ 1 6
and a 100% chance of receiving $ 5 6
, to a 100% chance of receiving $ 1 6
and a 0% chance of receiving . Since the first row under Option 2 gives the Player a 100% chance of receiving the high amount, rational subjects who understand the game should initially prefer Option 2, if they believe that there is less than a 100% chance they will receive the high amount under Option 1.
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Whereas most previous studies infer beliefs solely from analyzing subjects' choices or use a scoring rule to elicit beliefs, we elicit beliefs not once, but twice, and exploit the difference between the two measures to expose subjects' motives. Our study differs from previous studies of beliefs which have implemented a scoring rule technique (quadratic loss function, etc.) to elicit accurate beliefs. Subjects in the studies utilizing a scoring rule receive a "bonus" from accurately reporting beliefs in addition to the money earned from playing any game in which they had participated. Thus, only a small portion of each subject's payments come from accurately reporting beliefs. If any subject wished to conceal their true beliefs they would only need to sacrifice a small percentage of their entire payment to do so. So, while these scoring rules do offer monetary incentives to accurately report beliefs, there is no way to tell if subjects who wish to lie about their beliefs would give up their "bonus" in order to signal a false belief to the experimenter. In contrast, our method of eliciting revealed beliefs has higher stakes for the subjects.
Each subject's entire payout for the experiment is determined from their decision on the revealed belief elicitation task. Furthermore, while it is obvious to subjects that researchers are collecting their beliefs when using a scoring rule, it is not obvious to subjects that we are measuring their beliefs on the revealed belief task. This is so for two reasons. First, subjects had just completed the stated belief task. Recall, the stated belief task was labeled as the "Prediction Sheet" on which the subjects were asked to make predictions about how the other Player had behaved. On the Prediction Sheet, we asked subjects to tell us "What do you believe the other Player sent to you?" Thus, the framing of the stated belief task made 5 Previous price list style experiments have documented that a portion of subjects tend to switch multiple times between the two options presented (Holt and Laury, 2002; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; and Jacobsen and Petrie, 2009) . It is generally accepted that since multiple switch points can indicate subject confusion and are difficult to rationalize, a framing device may be necessary to avoid subject confusion and clarify the decision process (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012) . We used animated instructions in order to illustrate the directions for the subjects. Out of 82 subjects, two subjects had multiple switch points on one or more of their Payment Option forms and one subject who switched "backwards" (starting with Option 1 and later switching to Option 2). 6 Under Option 2, the probability of receiving the high amount declines with each descending row, while the probability of receiving the low amount increases with each descending row. At the row where a subject believes that they would have a higher probability of receiving the high amount from the other Player than the probability they see under Option 2, the subject has the incentive to switch to Option 1. Thus the row where each subject switches allows us to infer their belief about the chances of the other Player sending the high amount. In addition, we verbally instructed subjects that "Most people begin by preferring Option 2 and then switch to Option 1. Thus one way to view this task is to determine the best row to stop checking the box under Option 2 and start checking the box for Option 1" salient that we were inquiring about subjects' beliefs. In contrast, the aspect most salient for subjects in the revealed belief task was that their payment for the entire experiment was "on the line". Recall that the revealed belief task was labeled as the "Payment Option Form" on which subjects were instructed that "Now tell us how you would like to be paid." On the Payment Option Form, the subjects had two "payment" options. Subjects could either choose to be paid from the "Outcome of the Game" they had just played with their opponent, or, they could choose the outside gamble. Thus, the framing of the revealed belief task nudged subjects toward focusing on their payment.
After Stage 3, Player 1 rolled the dice in order to determine whether it would be Player 1's decision that would be chosen or if Player 1's decision would be overridden (i.e., the Experimenter's decision would be used instead). In order to maintain anonymity, all subjects rolled the dice. We propose that selfish individuals deem that their selfish action will be evaluated in a kinder light if they are perceived as reacting to a belief that their opponent was selfish rather than if they are perceived as truly believing that their opponent acted kindly toward them and subsequently taking advantage of this kindness. Since selfish individuals can no longer use their actions to signal their type to the experimenter, they must rely on the only means left available to maintain their social image: others' perceptions of their beliefs. Consequently, selfish individuals wishing to maintain their social image will state on their "stated" beliefs that they believe that there is a low probability of their opponent voluntarily sending the high amount and a high probability that their opponent will send them the low amount. This serves as an excuse for a selfish individual's behavior. However, we predict that not all of these individuals truly believe that their opponents were selfish. We posit that selfish individuals will be willing to risk their entire payment for the experiment on their true belief that their opponent was kind to them by sending the high amount. Thus, revealing that they believe they have a better chance of receiving the high amount from their opponent rather than from the outside gamble 7 .
D. Predictions
Prediction 3-Sophistication: The selfish individuals who are more sophisticated will be the individuals most likely to lie about their stated beliefs.
Our design allows us to separate out individuals who are more sophisticated decision makers. We term subjects who switched to Option 1 immediately on the last Payment Option form as being "Sophisticated" 8 . We predict that since these subjects are capable of understanding complex situations they are the subjects who would best be able to navigate situations in which they need to cover over their bad deeds. Examining the behavior of these "sophisticated" subjects can also help to rule out confusion as a factor in any differences seen between stated and revealed beliefs.
III. Main Findings
Eight-two subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at University of California, San 7 Recall that the payment received under Option 1 is dependent on the action of their opponent. Therefore, the sooner a subject "switches" to Option 1 the higher is their belief about their opponent sending them the high amount.
8 Recall that on the Stage 3 "Revealed" Belief elicitation form players are faced with two payment options: Option 1, receiving a payment from the outcome of the game played with their opponent and Option 2, receiving a payment from an outside gamble. Recall also that for the last Decision Sheet and corresponding Payment Option form the chance that the Experimenter will force player 1 to send the whole $10 to player 2 is 100%. Therefore, player 2 will receive $15 (the highest amount) with 100% probability. Therefore, it is in a player's best interest to switch to Option 1 (payment from the game) immediately since there is a 100% chance they will receive $15 from the game, while there is less than 100% chance they will receive $15 from the outside gamble.
Figure 2 -Fraction of Player 2s returning equal split to Player 1 as the chance that Player 1 was forced to be generous to Player 2 increases
As can be seen in Figure 2 approximately 30% of Player 2s return $15 to Player 1 when (as was publically stated) there is zero chance that Player 1 was forced to send $10. In this case (p =0), Player 2s know with certainty that if they receive $10 that it was Player 1 who decided to send the $10 and it was of their own volition. Therefore, responsibility for sending the $10 is unambiguous to Player 2s.
However, as the chance that Player 1 will be forced to send $10 increases, the fraction of Player 2s
reciprocating by returning an equal split of $15 declines. There is a small increase in the number of Player 2s returning $15 on the last decision sheet, where the probability of Player 1 being forced to send $10 reaches 100%.
The first column of Table 1 reports the estimates of a random-effects probit model of the probability of Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance*** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10
We now turn to Player 1 choice behavior. Figure 3 shows the fraction of Player 1s who voluntarily chose to send $10 to Player 2. When the probability of being forced to send the whole $10 to Player 2 is zero, around 30% of Player 1s voluntarily choose to send $10. The fraction Player 1s voluntarily choosing to send $10 increases gradually as the probability that they will be forced to do so increases.
When the probability of being forced to send $10 is 100%, half of Player 1s voluntarily choose to send $10. Table 2 shows the marginal effects from a random effects regression. The specification describes the probability of selecting $10. The explanatory variables include indicators for ≥ 0.05, ≥ 0.20, ≥ 0.40, ≥ 0.60, and p=1 (with p = 0 omitted). We report marginal effects at mean values. The coefficients imply that the only statistically significant increase in the probability of voluntarily choosing to send $10 occurs when p rises from 0.60 to 1 ( < 0.10, one tailed t-test). Significance: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10 Figure 4 shows stated beliefs, revealed beliefs and the actual frequency of Player 1 sending $10 to Player 2 (notice that this is the probability of Player 1 voluntarily choosing $10 and not the probability that Player 2 will receive $10). What is apparent from cursory examination is that there is a constant In order to further investigate the cause of this large difference between stated and revealed beliefs, we break the Player 2s into four types based on 2 dimensions: Selfishness and Sophistication. We code a Player 2 as being "Selfish" if they chose to send $5 (the lower amount) to Player 1 for every value of p.
B. Examing Beliefs: What Subjects Say They Believe Versus What They Reveal They Believe
Otherwise, the subject was coded as "Nice". We code a Player 2 as being "Sophisticated" if on the Payment Option Form where p = 1, the subject switched from preferring the Outside Gamble (Option 2)
to preferring the Outcome of the Game (Option 1) in Row 1 or Row 2 9 .
9 Subjects switching in Row 1 or Row 2 of the Payment Option form would have to be aware that on the last decision sheet, they were guaranteed to receive $10 as the probability of Player 1 being forced to send $10 was 100% on this sheet. Unsophisticated-Nice subjects do exhibit a statistically significant difference for p=0, p=0. 05, p=0.20, p=0.40, p=0 .60 and p=1. However, there is no statistically significant difference between Unsophisticated-Nice subjects' Stated Belief and the True Probability. This leads one to conclude that the Unsophisticated-Nice subjects fail to best respond to their beliefs in a way that is overly optimistic. Now to shed further light on Player 2 behavior, we contrast Player 2 belief data with Player 1 behavior on the two belief elicitation tasks. Looking at Figure 6 , it can be seen that Player 1s state that they believe that if Player 2 believes Player 1 is responsible for sending the $10 then Player 2 will positively reciprocate. In Figure 7 , we break Pl subjects into two groups, Nice and Selfish Player 1s. Player 1s who chose to send $10 to Player 2 at least three times are coded as "Nice," otherwise they are coded as "Selfish." Figure 7 displays Player 1 Stated Beliefs, Revealed Beliefs and the Actual Frequency of Player 2 returning an equal split. Figure 7 is that "Nice" Player 1s believe there is a higher chance of receiving the high amount back from Player 2 than do the Selfish Player 1s. Also, Selfish Player 1s were better at predicting the Actual Frequency that Player 2 would return an equal split than are Nice Player 1s.
IV. Strategic Image Manipulation
The discrepancy between the beliefs Selfish-Sophisticated Players express on their stated beliefs and their revealed beliefs raises several questions.
First, which belief represents Players "true" beliefs? If Sophisticated-Selfish Players' true beliefs are as they stated on their stated beliefs task, then these Players are not best responding to these beliefs on their revealed beliefs task. If they truly believed that chances of Player 1 sending the high amount ($10) were as low as they stated on their stated beliefs, then this should have been reflected by their choices on the Payment Option Form in the revealed beliefs task. Instead, their choices on their Payment Option Form indicate that their true underlying belief is that there was in fact a higher chance that Player 1 had sent Player 2 the high amount ($10). These Sophisticated Players are the Players who were able to correctly calculate and assess that they were better off switching early from Option 2 to Option 1 on Decision Sheet 6, where the chance they would receive the high amount ($10) was 100%. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend how the Sophisticated Players can understand how to maneuver to make the most money for themselves in one part of the game and yet be confused or unable to best respond to their own beliefs on the very same task. Players had preferences for reciprocity and that these preferences were their driving decision making process. However, the revealed beliefs paint a different picture entirely. Behavior that would previously had been viewed as supporting hypotheses of reciprocity or guilt-aversion is now shown to support the hypothesis that individuals are indeed selfish and display a sharp level of sophistication in manipulating their image. This is not to say that prosocial behavior in the form of pure or impure altruism does not exist. However, what this does imply is that if individuals wish to be selfish, attempts to nudge them to cooperate through appeals to reciprocity or guilt will not alter their choice behavior. In the face of social pressure to comply with norms sophisticated selfish individuals will not in fact cooperate, but merely take measures to make others believe they are complying with social norms. .
The third question pertains to whether Sophisticated-Selfish Players believe their own lies. We suggest that Sophisticated-Selfish Players do not believe their own lies and that these Players knowingly misstate the beliefs when they think that others will be able to observe their beliefs, as in the stated beliefs task. 
V. Conclusion
In order to examine whether image concerns affect how individuals express their beliefs we implement a new technique of contrasting two differing belief elicitation measures that identify both what people say they believe, and what they are revealed to believe. We find evidence that selfish, image-conscious individuals will lie about the beliefs they held about their opponent when carrying out this selfish action.
Specifically, Selfish Players state that they believed their opponent would act selfishly toward them.
However, in the revealed beliefs elicitation Selfish Players stake their entire payoff on the opposite belief, that their opponent was in fact cooperative. In order to rule out confusion, we measure the "sophistication" of each subject. Evidence indicates that it is the individuals who are both Sophisticated and Selfish who are the most frequent users of the manipulation mechanism. While previous studies of reciprocity concluded that Players' beliefs about their opponents' intentions revealed that their subjects had a preference for reciprocity, our results contradict this finding. Our results suggest that individuals have a preference for being perceived as being cooperative instead of actually behaving cooperatively.
Thus, if one wishes to take a selfish or uncooperative action, they can do so without fear of retaliation or punishment so long as they concoct a socially acceptable story justifying their selfish behavior.
Our results have important policy implications. Previous studies have advocated appeals to individuals' emotions in order to promote cooperative behavior. However, our results indicate that guilt may in fact cause selfish individuals to not only act selfishly, but to cover up their selfish actions with lies. In fact, recent evidence from the healthcare field indicates that when doctors make their patients feel "guilty" about being overweight or other unhealthy behaviors a significant number of patients not only maintained their undesired behavior, but also lied and told their doctors that they had changed their behavior to the desired behavior (Darby, et.al. 2014 ).
We believe our results also serve as a caution for studying data in situations where social image is especially heightened. For example, the use of "big data" analytics from social networking websites has become popular. Large consumer firms and political campaigns have begun to rely on data gleaned from social media sites. However, since social image is particularly salient to individuals frequenting these websites, the truthfulness of their actions and statements on these websites may be suspect. Our results suggest that using data from these sources may lead to faulty conclusions given our evidence that people 
